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This issue of International Studies of Management and Organization brings together five articles that reflect the 
rich array of contemporary research that is being conducted into the activities of the management consultancy 
industry. Management consultancy, in various forms, has existed for as long as complex organizations. However, 
its increasing economic significance, associated with the rapid expansion in the number of consultancies and the 
rise of large multinational consultancy firms, as well as the influence and impact of the fashionable management 
knowledge and techniques on which much of their work is based, are more recent phenomena. To date, detailed 
conceptual and empirical research into the work of consultants has been slight (for a summary, see Clark and 
Fincham 2002; Kipping and Engwall 2002). Much, therefore, remains to be done if we are to develop a more 
penetrating and nuanced understanding of this activity. This special issue begins to rectify this situation by 
bringing together in one volume original and innovative contributions from leading academics in this emerging 
field.  
Our purpose in this introduction is to set the scene for the issue as whole. We begin by discussing the nature of 
management consultancy, and relate this to some of the recent developments within the industry. We then review 
the reasons why management consultancy work is increasingly attracting academic attention. Following this, we 
examine the possible consequences of a downturn for management consultancy services. Finally, we outline the 
content of the individual contributions that comprise this issue.  
 
Industry differentiation 
One way of understanding management consultancy is to see it as a clearly bounded “occupation,” and to define 
characteristics and factors that account for its unique occupational identity. The problem with this view is that 
consultancy then tends to be seen in relatively narrow professional or clinical terms. The consultant role is akin to 
that of medical practitioners, in that they diagnose organizational illnesses and prescribe appropriate remedies. In 
contrast, drawing parallels with the wider management structure paints a different picture and emphasizes, 
instead, the depth and complexity of a whole industry. References to the “management advice industry,” or to 
consultancy as a part of the broader business services industry, suggest that this is a differentiated structure that 
encompasses a broad group of occupations; what defines “consultancy” is thus a relationship to a market in 
knowledge, rather than a static skills set. The boundaries of this cluster of activities are themselves complex and 
overlapping. At the lower end of the industry, for example, a multitude of medium-size and small firms, and many 
sole practitioners, supply a bewildering range of services such as executive search and selection, psychometric 
testing, process consultancy, and coaching and training (e.g., Sturdy 2002). 
At the large-firm end of the spectrum is a range of technical and specialist activities (in areas such as construction 
and engineering) that do not overlap much with management consultancy per se, but which are still part of the 
broader “consulting” industry. Even within what would normally be regarded as management consultancy, a 
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range of specialties, such as information technology (IT) and finance, are based on specialized skills that are 
formalized and accredited by separate professional bodies. But others, like strategy and change management, 
which constitute what is often regarded as mainstream management consulting, closely parallel general 
managerial rather than professional skills, in that they require no special accreditation. 
However, if “management consultancy” is this highly differentiated cluster of activities, to date it is the firms at 
the top end of the industry, which represent a significant proportion of industry earnings, where most attention has 
been focused. While the industry is composed of many thousands of firms, it is primarily the giant international 
firms, and the major strategy and systems firms, that have been the focus of commentaries and research. While the 
ideas and concepts they develop are sometimes adopted from external sources, and reflect famous and familiar 
fashionable acronyms such as BPR, TQM, and KM, these are mixed with specialized and proprietary ideas. As 
described by Heusinkveld and Benders in this issue, these are outputs of well-resourced internal functions for 
delivering new concepts. Furthermore, as Armbrüster and Kipping (also in this issue) argue, these giant firms bear 
a considerable part of the responsibility for disseminating management ideas internationally. They have spread to 
and penetrated different countries, often acquiring or merging with local consultancies; and they have 
spearheaded the transmission of global best practices and new organizational designs, channeling the competitive 
forces of the world economy (see also Kipping and Engwall 2002). 
In addition to being an influential disseminator of knowledge, big firm management consultancy is also highly 
dynamic and continually changing its structure and functions. Until recently this sector of the industry was 
dominated by the so-called Big Five global accountancy firms. These were large international accounting 
practices that expanded into management consultancy on the basis of a symbiosis (some would say an “unholy 
alliance”) between the two activities. The more stable, but slower growing, auditing business facilitated an entrée 
into client firms that permitted the consultancy divisions of these firms to expand rapidly. The Big Five were 
Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). However, 
these five firms were themselves formed through a series of mergers and acquisitions, and at various times in the 
past twenty years have been the Big Eight and the Big Six (Stevens 1981). These firms came to dominate the 
consulting industry league tables, occupying five of the top six places (Kipping 2002). They have employed tens 
of thousands of consultants all over the world, and have had multi-billion dollar revenues. One consequence of 
this development has been that the traditional audit came to represent a smaller and smaller proportion of the 
revenues of accountancy firms, with the consequence that these firms were seen to be developing a new and 
highly successful business model. In conjunction with this change, they became re-labeled as “global 
multidisciplinary partnerships” or “professional service firms” (PSFs) as they sought to further diversify into 
other areas, such as legal services. 
However, this issue of the journal is being published at a time when this sector of the industry has been 
undergoing rapid and radical transformation, in major part as a result of the corporate scandals at Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia Communication. These events have undermined the premises upon which the 
diversification strategies of the Big Five were based and, consequently, the business model itself. In 2000, for 
example, Arthur Andersen earned $25 million from auditing Enron’s books and another $27 million from 
providing various consulting services.1 The idea that managers could pay their auditors to give them advice has 
come to be seen as a major source of conflict of interest, particularly if the audit fee is smaller than the consulting 
fee. Consequently, the large accountancy firms have given up arguing that that there is no conflict of interest 
between auditing a company’s books and providing consulting advice. In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,2 
which became law in the United States in July 2002, makes it “unlawful” for accounting firms to offer a number 
of other kinds of services to companies whose accounts they audit. In response to fierce public criticism and 
legislation, the large accounting firms have generally separated their audit and consulting practices. In 2000, Cap 
Gemini acquired the consulting business of Ernst & Young. In the first part of 2002, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
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announced an initial public offering for PwC Consulting, to be branded “Monday.” However, several months later 
PwC Consulting was sold to IBM. Also in 2002, KPMG sold its U.K. and Dutch practices to Atos Origin, to form 
Atos KPMG Consulting. The remaining parts of KPMG Consulting renamed themselves BearingPoint.3 Before 
Arthur Andersen ceased trading its stock in August 2002, its consultancy practice was incorporated into that 
owned by Deloitte & Touche. Despite announcing the sale of Deloitte Consulting in 2002, its parent company 
presently has no plans to separate the businesses. 
 
Table 1: Strategic activities and firms in top level management consultancy 
Area of activity    Firm 
Corporate strategy    McKinsey, Bain, BCG 
Accounting/IT     Big Five 
IT/Systems     Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, EDS, IBM, SAP 
 
 
While the global accounting-and-consulting firms have tended to dominate in terms of sheer size (e.g., number of 
consultants employed, volume of business, turnover), firms at the top end of the industry reflect at least three 
areas of strategic activity (see Table 1). Traditionally, the highest-profile firms in management consultancy were 
the strategy firms that specialized in corporate advice and were influential in delivering new knowledge into board 
rooms. The doyen of all strategy firms was (and is) McKinsey; but others, such as Bain and the Boston Consulting 
Group, also pioneered basic strategic concepts and brought the industry to public attention. Kipping (2002) has 
argued that, more recently, we have seen competitive interaction between corporate strategizing as a key 
consultancy activity, and newer activities around IT and information systems (IS), and this is now the 
fundamental dynamic within the sector. As we noted above, the Big Five moved into high-level management 
consultancy on the back of massive auditing businesses. But their spectacular growth also reflected, in part, their 
capacity to develop activities in commercial computing. (Groups like Anderson/Accenture, for example, 
specialized in very large IT projects.) 
The reason the Big Five were able to move so successfully into this area of consulting is an interesting issue, 
particularly since there was a distinctive group of very large IT/IS firms (such as Cap Gemini, EDS, the 
reconfigured IBM, and the German software giant SAP) in occupancy. These firms grew out of software houses 
and the computer industry itself, and were already performing IT/systems consulting. It may be that the sheer size 
and longevity of the IT boom allowed room for all, or that the traditional links between accounting and computing 
helped the Big Five to manage IT-related activity. At any rate, as Kipping (2002) has suggested, what we 
currently see in the sector is the working through of these competitive forces and, in particular, the possible 
erosion of the high-status-strategy firms’ market position. This thesis, extended in this issue by Armbrüster and 
Kipping, points out that traditional-strategy firms seem unable to change their cultures to capitalize on the growth 
in technology consultancy, and seem to be ineffectually tinkering with IT/systems. In fact, in the latest mergers, it 
has been IT-related consulting and elements of the Big Five that have come together—for example, Cap Gemini 
with Ernst & Young, and IBM with PriceWaterhouseCoopers. This latest stage in market restructuring seems to 
have left the traditional-strategy firms even more vulnerable. 
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Reasons for increasing academic interest 
Growth and economic significance of the industry 
Of primary importance has been the increased economic significance of the industry. The origins of management 
consulting lie in the efficiency and time-and motion studies pioneered by Charles Bedaux, Harrington Emerson, 
Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, and Frederick Taylor at the turn of the last century (Henry 2002; Kipping 2002; 
McKenna 1995; Wright 2000). For example, in the United Kingdom, prior to the entry of the leading U.S. 
consultancies, in 1956 the four founding members of the Management Consultancies Association (Associated 
Industrial Consultants, Urwick Orr & Partners, Personnel Administration, Production Engineering) employed 
around 800 consultants and accounted for three quarters of a total market estimated at £4 million (Tisdall 1982). 
In the early 1960s Booz, Allen & Hamilton, founded in 1914 and the largest member of the U.S.-based 
Association of Consulting Management Engineers, employed 800 professional staff in the United States and 
seventy overseas. McKinsey, founded in 1926 and perhaps the archetypal consulting firm, at the same time 
employed about 200 consultants, fifteen of whom were based in Europe (Kipping 1999). So, for much of the 
twentieth century the consulting industry was dominated by a small number of firms who, although they consulted 
to large multinational organizations, were themselves not that big in terms of numbers of staff and revenues. All 
this changed in the 1980s. 
During the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, the management consultancy industry was one of the fastest 
growing sectors of many advanced economies. In 1980, worldwide revenues were estimated to be $3 billion. By 
2001 this figure had grown to around $62 billion (Kennedy Information 2002). The spectacular growth of the 
industry during this period is further evidenced by the fact that approximately 80 percent of firms operating in the 
industry were established after 1980 (Ernst and Kieser 2002). 
This astonishing transformation indicates that the industry has come to represent a significant element of the now-
dominant service sector, or “knowledge economy,” within many advanced economies. However, behind it many 
believe lies an increasing power over managerial thinking and action. Consultancy is intimately linked with new 
forms of “fashionable” management knowledge. Indeed, many people, whether in their roles as employees or 
citizens, will have experienced the effects of some kind of consultancy-led initiative. Alongside management 
gurus, the business media, and business academics, consultants have been attributed a key role as agents in the 
creation, dissemination, and transfer of new management ideas (Abrahamson and Fairchild 1999). Recent 
discussions relating to management fashion and diffusion of business knowledge mean that we now have a more 
differentiated concept of managerial knowledge, one that extends to forms of knowledge that are packaged and 
commodified and traded in a marketplace for management ideas (Abrahamson 1996a and 1996b; Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2001). Consultants are not only traders in ideas, of course, but in ideas that have consequences and 
take shape as management practices. Thus, interest has grown in management consultancy both as an influencer 
and carrier of new organizational forms and strategies between organizations and nations (Kipping 1997). 
 
Negative image of consultancy 
In addition what we might consider more material reasons for pursuing an interest in consultancy, there is also a 
fascination with management consultancy that derives from a raft of factors making it the center of interesting 
puzzles and dilemmas, and tying them in with wider concerns in the study of management and organization. The 
suspicion has grown, particularly in the media, that consultants exercise influence at the highest levels of 
corporations and, moreover, that this represents a covert and unaccountable influence over policies, programs, and 
strategies. The characterization of management consultancy in the media, even before the emergence of a series of 
corporate scandals in the United States in 2001, has been extremely poor. They have been consistently portrayed 
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as: expensive (i.e., charging exorbitant fees) and ineffective (i.e., their advice rarely works); as destroying 
organizations; as repackaging old ideas and developing empty buzzwords; as running amok if not tightly 
controlled; as undermining the quality of management; as lacking independent insight; as acting in their own 
interest, rather than the client’s, and so forth. Thus, part of the interest in consultancy stems from the “masters of 
the universe” view of them, and from beliefs about the insidious and unaccountable power they might command 
within global capitalism (Ashford 1998; Byrne 2002; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 1996; O’Shea and Madigan 
1997; Skapinker 2002). 
In Jackall’s (1988) seminal study of corporate power and politics, consultants are heavily implicated in the 
Byzantine and Machiavellian world of U.S. corporate life. He saw them as a kind of benign parasite, living off the 
power process that wholly defines interaction at these levels of management. In this sense, consultants seem to 
“crop up everywhere,” and seem to be key actors or bit players in many current management dramas being played 
out in the world’s media. It has been pointed out, for example, that consultancy deeply resonates with the myths 
and narratives of organizational change (Clark 1995). In response to radical discontinuities in market 
environments, organizations have increasingly embarked on programs of fundamental change, so much so that 
“change management” is now seen by many as a specialized skill that only outsiders possess. The narratives of 
change that dominate modern managerialism are also dominant within the discourses of management consultancy, 
and constitute the organizing themes and issues in consulting work (Tienari et al. 2001). 
 
Emergence of the critical approach 
A further reason for the intensification of academic interest in consultancy work has been a growing 
dissatisfaction with the dominant approach prevalent in the literature from the late 1950s until the mid-1980s. 
This literature was primarily concerned with one approach to consultancy—organization development (OD). 
There is not space here to summarize the voluminous literature on this consultancy approach; however, its main 
preoccupation was with identifying and examining those factors that were perceived as maximizing its 
effectiveness to organizational interventions. In essence, much of the OD literature has been concerned with 
identifying and then proposing solutions to particular problems. In this respect, it is highly normative and targeted 
at practitioners. 
More recently, another approach to examining consultancy work has emerged that is very different in character, 
tone, and focus. This is termed the “critical perspective.” It differs from the OD approach in a number of 
important ways. First, whereas the OD literature gained much of its purchase and value from the fact that many 
leading commentators were at one time successful practicing consultants themselves, in the more recent literature 
this has been viewed as a key weakness. Instead, it has been argued that a narrow concern with prescriptive and 
formulaic advice to clients and practitioners is, at the very least, limited in its contribution to a thorough 
conceptualization and understanding of the nature of consultancy work. This arises because the OD literature is 
located, as it were, inside the activity itself. It assumes that management consultants have already convinced 
clients as to their value and “know-how.” These are second-order problems. That is, they arise once it has been 
accepted by clients that consultants have something useful to offer. In this respect, it is argued that the real 
problem faced by consultants is how they demonstrate their value to clients in the first instance. This is a major 
focus of the critical literature that examines the strategies and techniques employed by consultants to convince 
clients that they have something of value to offer (Alvesson 1993; Clark 1995; Starbuck 1992). 
A second major difference between the OD literature and the more recent critical literature has been the status of 
consultancy knowledge and, consequently, the problematization of any claims to being a professional occupation. 
The OD literature was grounded in a root metaphor of the consultant as professional helper. Consultants were 
therefore presented as drawing on an expert body of knowledge based on advances in behavioral sciences in order 
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to solve client problems. Their activities were seen as synonymous with the role of professional helpers 
remedying illnesses in client organizations. Much of this derived from the normative and self-congratulatory 
nature of this literature, which was often written by practicing consultants about their own interventions and 
experiences. On the other hand the critical literature has argued that management consultancy is not a profession, 
since it does not have access to a unique, esoteric, and defendable knowledge-base. A key focus of this literature 
has been on how consultants sustain their knowledge claims. In this sense, claims of professionalism have been 
seen as one resource that management consultants can draw upon to sustain their claims of authority, status, and 
credibility (Alvesson and Johansson 2002). 
Finally, the critical literature has not been concerned with the effectiveness of consultancy work or, generally, has 
been motivated by a wish to improve or at least influence practice. Rather, commentators have primarily sought to 
utilize the example of the consultancy industry to contribute to a range of debates concerned with the changing 
nature and location of knowledge production in a number of discipline areas, particularly geography, history, 
management, and sociology. Thus, the growth of the management consultancy industry has been seen to indicate 
broader changes in the advanced Western nations with the shift in the axes of these economies from 
manufacturing to services. It has also been related to the increasing importance of knowledge, and to the debates 
surrounding the nature and deployment of knowledge within, and between, organizations and nations. 
 
Consultancy exposes the nature of management 
Finally, academic researchers are drawn to the study of management consultancy because it tells us much about 
management itself. Consultancy is an externalized form of management—and, more than that (as Fincham argues, 
in this issue), there exists a parallelism between consultancy issues and central managerial structures and 
processes. The latter are often expressed in a sharpened or stylized form within consultancy. In particular, many 
comparisons center on the “ambivalent” status of management consultancy (which itself mirrors management’s 
own uncertain standing). Consultants are “love-hate” figures who occupy a highly marginalized position. Are they 
expert and essential helpers, or parasites whose skills are little better than those of the con man? Does the 
knowledge they disseminate—influential fashions in modern management—constitute a set of powerful 
organizational techniques, or is it snake oil? And if it is the latter (or if this view is only partly true), how does one 
explain the ascendancy of the consultancy industry? The related issue of professionalism within management 
consultancy itself poses interesting and complex questions: Should consultancy be thought of as a profession 
(albeit an emerging one), or is some other occupational designation more accurate? Fascinating questions in their 
own right, they have strong parallels with the issue of professionalism in management. These are some of the 
concerns that motivate the emerging literature on management consultancy, and which make up core themes in 
the articles that follow in this issue. 
 
Consulting in a downturn? 
Presently, the entire business advice industry is struggling to maintain revenues in the face of a severe economic 
downturn. Volumes of business and partner profits have fallen since 2000, and the all-important “leverage” 
figures (i.e., billable hours per consultant) have started to slip (Byrnes 2003). Many firms are now “stuck with far 
too many consultants and not nearly enough assignments” (Byrne 2002, 68). All this follows a series of hammer 
blows to corporate activity: the collapse of the “dotcom,” Internet, and telecommunications boom, the wave of 
corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom), and the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. In some 
ways, consultants (like undertakers and accountants) always hope to benefit from hard times; after all, they are 
supposed to create efficiencies and cut costs and enhance competitive advantage, which is the current agenda in 
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many firms. Nevertheless, the prosaic truth is that firms are examining their spending on consultancy services 
much more carefully as the general level of business activity declines. But there is also a more critical atmosphere 
with respect to the utility and value of consultancy work that is making clients more hesitant in commissioning 
assignments. 
This situation has considerable significance for modern management consultancy, the identity of which has been 
defined in large part by an era of apparently unending exponential growth. But whether this represents a 
temporary setback, or a long-lasting shift in the nature of the demand for consultancy services, remains to be seen. 
On the one hand, management consultancy is not simply a “big” industry; to an extent, it has become inextricably 
intertwined into the fabric of the economic system. The advice and opinions supplied, especially by the major 
firms, are frequently an integral part of the relationship between firms and sources of institutional finance (so that 
it is an understatement to say that there is a mere “appetite” for advice). Also, “outsourcing” to consultancies is 
not just a management choice, but a prerequisite of certain organizational strategies and designs (for example, 
lean production). 
On the other hand, the recent decline in demand for consultancy may itself be more structural. Some suggest that 
present market uncertainties prefigure the end of a long economic upswing, and the beginning of a period of 
market uncertainty that may be equally long-lived. But while it may be fanciful to propose any simple connection 
between the consultancy boom and a twenty-year bull market, there may be some historical constraints operating. 
There are uncanny parallels between the growth of the past two decades and the appearance on the scene of 
figures like consultants and management gurus, and the fashionable knowledge they trade in. In any case, the 
straightforward reason for wanting to study management consultancy—the double-digit growth that this 
astonishing industry has sustained—may eventually need to be reassessed. 
The impact of current and recent events on the reputation of the management consultancy industry, more broadly, 
also remains open-ended. At Enron, as Byrne (2002) pointed out, McKinsey was central to the evolution of 
corporate thinking. Furthermore, Jeffrey K. Skilling, Enron’s former CEO, was once a McKinsey partner. While 
not implicated in the controversial accounting and reporting model and the actual fraud, the consulting firm was 
the architect of many corporate strategies (e.g., securitized credit, the contracts strategy, and the so-called asset-
light strategy) that had helped to transform Enron into a giant energy trader. McKinsey’s role, therefore, must call 
into question the whole issue of the quality of expensive corporate advice. While a consultancy may duck the 
blame for this or that failed strategy, the more general point is what such episodes say about the prescience of 
consultants, or their claims to put the client’s interests first. In the Enron case, the world’s pre-eminent strategy 
firm had intimate contact with a client that was heading for the abyss, but apparently saw none of it coming, nor 
issued any cautionary advice. The ambivalent status of management consultants betokens a considerable capacity 
to deflect blame when the magic doesn’t work. Nevertheless, changes in the broad economic climate in which 
they will increasingly have to operate may be a constraint on the bloated reputations of recent years. 
 
Articles in this issue 
Having discussed some of the key developments and issues that confront the industry and researchers, it remains 
to outline the way in which the articles in this issue contribute to our understanding. 
We begin with an article that links the developments in the consultancy industry noted above with an 
investigation into the consequences of these for the top-tier strategy-consulting firms. These firms have long been 
considered the archetypal consultancies and have occupied a central position in the broad perceptions of the 
industry. For many, consulting is synonymous with the activities of these firms. However, they are facing intense 
competition from large multinational IT/IS consultancies that is threatening their long-term survival as 
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independent entities. As Kipping (2002) has previously argued, in response to periodic changes in the interests of 
clients, the industry’s development has been characterized by three main phases: (1) scientific management, 
where the key issue was shop-floor efficiency; (2) an organization and strategy phase; and (3) the current phase, 
founded on IT-based networks and enterprise-wide systems. A key conclusion of this analysis is that, during each 
phase, the pre-eminent consultancies have been different firms. While some consultancies may survive from one 
wave to another, they are unable to maintain their leading position in successive waves. He identified three 
reasons for this. First, the reputations of consultancies that come to the fore in any one wave are difficult to 
change; second, because the waves reflect distinctive managerial problems, the skills of consultants change from 
one wave to another; finally, the ratio of junior to senior staff, which Maister (1993) termed “leverage,” varies 
between waves, so that consultancies are not structured to offer services in different phases. He concluded that 
these barriers are virtually insurmountable; firms are locked into their waves, and it is all but impossible for 
consultancies in one wave to compete with the succeeding generation. This creates the irony that consultancies 
seem unable to do for themselves what they sell to clients—namely, the ability to manage and survive change.  
Building on this argument, in this issue Armbrüster and Kipping examine the consequences of the inexorable 
movement toward the pre-eminence of IT/IS advice for the future of the second-phase consulting firms, which 
they term “traditional strategy-and-organization consultancies” (TSOCs). Using evolutionary economics, 
information economics, and embeddedness theory, they argue that TSOCs have a number of survival options: 
entering IT consulting and price competition, a divisionalization strategy, a niche strategy, and an alliance 
strategy. Each of these possibilities has different upsides and downsides. However, they conclude that these 
choices may themselves become transformed by broader changes in the management consultancy market (e.g., 
recent corporate scandals, economic downturn, entry of hardware/software firms into consultancy, regional 
differences in the market). These, in turn, create further uncertainties for the future of TSOCs. 
Werr and Styhre examine how managers discursively construct the client-consultant relationship. This issue has 
been a major concern of the consultancy literature to date. Building on the argument that contemporary discourses 
about organizations have shifted from bureaucratic to network, they argue that these imply different constructions 
of the client-consultant relationship. In the former discourse, the relationship is portrayed as essentially 
contractual, arms-length, and temporary. The client is pictured as in control, with the ability to hire and fire the 
consultant. Given the consultant’s dependence on repeat business, this places the consultant in a subordinate 
position. Thus, the consultant is hired to assist with a specific organizational problem and essentially remains an 
outsider. In contrast, in the latter discourse, although the relationship is characterized more as a partnership, the 
consultant is portrayed as being dominant, with the client pictured as the naïve victim of the consultant’s powerful 
rhetoric and impression-management skills. The consultant, therefore, becomes more integrated into the client 
organization. 
Drawing upon interviews with experienced users of consultancy services in two Swedish telecom organizations, 
Werr and Styhre conclude that both views of the client-consultant relationship are held, often simultaneously. 
They conclude that these two contrasting views exist in parallel because bureaucratic notions are used when 
describing the desired relationship, whereas network notions relate to the actual use of consultants. This may arise 
because the former in actuality may not encourage a close, productive, and long-term relationship between client 
and consultant. 
Fincham draws attention to another aspect of the critical literature—namely, the extent to which “metaphors” of 
consultancy are employed. Management consultants are frequently allegorized as witchdoctors, performers, and 
so forth, suggesting a need for contrasting images and a symbolic language with which to describe this complex 
of occupations and activities. Developing this view, Fincham suggests a comparative concept that aims to 
describe consultancy work more accurately and fully. Consultants might be envisaged as the “agents’ agent”—in 
other words, as agents of management, who are themselves agents of capital. Agency theory draws an analogy 
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between the client-consultant relationship and the principal-agent relationship, and it allies itself with those who 
see consultancy as “relational work,” the parameters of which are bound up with the links with managerial clients. 
(Interestingly, too, agency theory also stresses tenuous status: The agent, like the consultant, is a marginalized 
figure, accepted into neither the class of principals whose interests they represent, nor the “lower” economic 
groups.) 
The use of an “agency problematic” to understand consultancy highlights forms of uncertainty and, more 
especially, power and knowledge as twin dimensions that underlie general uncertainty. Using an interview study 
of consultants from large accounting and IT-based firms, Fincham first explores the ways in which consultants 
relate to the power game waged by internal groups, and the ambivalent position of consultants in relation to these 
principals. Second, consultant knowledge is contrasted with local forms of knowledge that client managers 
possess. Combining these two forms of knowledge represents another problematic area, as the representative role 
of the consultant-as-agent ties their knowledge to that of the principal. So while consultants certainly work within 
a political map, they do not see themselves as power brokers or as independent of political sponsorship. Likewise, 
they vigorously market their “knowledge base,” while having few pretensions to a monopoly of knowledge. Thus, 
the idea of consultants as agents of managerial power suggests consultancy as a kind of “extrusion” of this power 
base; management itself rests on attenuated forms of power, and the doubtful legitimacy of consultancy is only 
superimposed on the original mandate from capital. 
Scarbrough places consultants in a broader context as knowledge intermediaries, and contrasts their role in 
developing management knowledge with another intermediate group, namely professionals. This comparison is 
explored against the background of knowledge management (KM), a recent and influential fashion. So this article 
provides a specific fashion example, but also a new angle on the relationship between consultancy work and 
professional activity. The article develops an “institutional change perspective” on managerial knowledge and 
expounds a three-stage model. New management knowledge develops via a series of “episodes”—theorization, 
diffusion, and institutionalization—wherein professionals and consultants play different roles. Professionals 
mainly instigate the theorization of fashions; consultants’ role is diffusion; and both groups institutionalize 
fashion. Thus, stepping back from the model for a moment, we see some significant implications. The creation of 
fashionable knowledge is viewed in terms of “theorizing” its components (with the implications this has for how 
we think of the creation of new knowledge, and for the kinds of intermediary groups capable of conducting such 
an exercise). Also, while many studies simply regard “diffusion” as the general spreading and popularizing of 
new knowledge, the suggestion here is that diffusion really needs to be differentiated from the actual embedding 
of knowledge in practical settings. 
In relation to knowledge management, Scarbrough points out that one professional group in particular—the 
information systems profession—was responsible for an “outpouring” of publications that originally constituted 
the KM discourse. Following this initial theorization, in the diffusion episode KM became a core product of major 
consultancies, which were heavily involved in getting the bandwagon rolling (the use of rhetorical strategies was 
crucial in this phase). And finally, the fashion was institutionalized within organizations by both groups; but 
evidence suggests that internal systems groups played the biggest role. In fact, the empirical evidence (some of 
which comes from Scarbrough’s own extensive studies of KM) indicates that KM was only weakly 
institutionalized; this high-profile fashion achieved only low user satisfaction and utilization. What happened in 
several cases was that expectations created in the diffusion phase were not delivered—promises of knowledge 
sharing degenerated into technology-driven systems (e.g., Internet sites and the like). Hence, Scarbrough sketches 
a complex and dynamic relationship between the episodes and intermediaries. The different groups helped each 
other along in respective episodes (i.e., theorizing and diffusing); but in the final phase, tensions between “the 
colonizing efforts of professionals and the commodifying activities of consultants” constrained the legitimacy of 
KM. 
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In contrast to the previous two articles, Heusinkveld and Benders focus internally on processes within 
consultancies. What they call “new concept development,” in effect, represents the production process of this 
business service industry. Their analysis draws extremely useful parallels with the innovation literature. In 
particular, they propose a phased model of innovation that proceeds from the creative initiation of new concepts, 
through intermediate development stages, to their shaping as marketable techniques. The value of making these 
discriminations is that particular internal cultures and repertoires are seen to be associated with each stage, and 
these demonstrate how conflicts and problems in the management of concept innovation arise. Interviews with 
consultants in twenty-four Dutch consultancies are used to test and explore this model.  
The data provide a rich descriptive account of new concept development, showing how specific tensions resolve 
themselves into contrasting repertoires of activity. In particular, the researchers distinguished between a 
“professional” and a “corporate” repertoire, which reflects the fundamental divide between the demands of 
spontaneous creativity and corporate control over vital development processes. Consultancies are never able 
finally to resolve these basic problems; they persist in a state of creative tension; but consultancies have a range of 
more or less successful strategies to alleviate conflict. They can start with an approach to innovation that 
emphasizes professional freedom, and gradually switch to a more administrative one. (Here, consultants’ 
“hobbies” are gradually brought under corporate control.). They can designate a few specialist innovators 
(effectively allowing a professional repertoire to operate within a corporate one); and sometimes a deus ex 
machina, in the shape of an innovation champion, builds common ground between conflicting groups. 
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Notes 
1. Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2000, on the fees paid to accountancy firms for 
audit and consulting work, revealed that they were paid an average $2.2 million for each corporate audit, and $5.9 
million for selling other services to the audit client. 
2. This act was named after its lead sponsors, U.S. Senate Banking Committee chairman Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) 
and House Financial Services Committee chairman Michael G. Oxley (R-OH). It creates an oversight committee 
for the accounting industry; establishes or increases criminal penalties for corporate fraud; prohibits external 
auditors from performing internal audits or consulting on seven other services, including financial information 
system design; and codifies the investment banking analyst rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. A parallel can be can be drawn between this legislation and the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933. 
McKenna (1995) has argued that this act, by separating commercial and investment banking, and by prohibiting 
commercial banks from engaging in “non-banking activities,” provided an impetus for the expansion of 
management consulting in the United States in the mid-1930s, a period when many of the leading firms over the 
next fifty years were founded. 
3. These international accountancy firms are often networks of national partnerships, rather than single-owner 
multinational firms. In these circumstances, it is the partners from the different national practices in the network 
who decide which firm to sell their consultancy business to. This may vary, depending upon local strengths. 
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